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Foreign Assistance at Home: 
Increasing USAID Accountability 
Through Victim Participation 
Rights in the  
Foreign Assistance Act 
Shefali Saxena* 
The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) has been the chief arm of U.S. foreign assistance, 
dedicated to sustainable development in developing countries. 
However, in the aftermath of the Cold War, support for USAID 
waned, resulting in a loss of autonomy, structural integrity, and 
overall effectiveness. A troubling consequence of these internal 
problems has been the misappropriation of USAID funds, where 
local governments in developing countries have abused these 
contributions by using them for personal gain at the expense of 
their citizens’ human rights. With reduced capacity and 
inadequate monitoring mechanisms, USAID has been unable to 
address these pressing human rights violations. Current victims 
do not have any means of domestic recourse, and this Note 
submits that it is USAID’s duty to provide some form of 
redress. This Note proposes that Congress should amend the 
Foreign Assistance Act to include a private right of action for 
victims and their representatives to challenge USAID’s actions. 
Such an amendment would be consistent with other U.S. agency 
practice, and more importantly, would comport with the U.S.’ 
and international community’s commitment to addressing 
human rights abuses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* B.A. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; J.D., Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law 
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I. Introduction 
The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) has faced several institutional and organizational problems 
since its inception in 1961,1 but recently Human Rights Watch has 
highlighted an additional, growing concern.2 USAID funding for 
projects in developing countries such as Ethiopia3 and Vietnam4 has 
 
1. See F. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson & Andrew Natsios, Arrested 
Development, Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool, 87 FOREIGN 
AFF. 123, 124 (2008). 
2. See Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Deadly 
Aid, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2012/08/06/deadly_aid?page=full. 
3. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT FREEDOM; HOW AID 
UNDERWRITES REPRESSION IN ETHIOPIA 40–41 (2010), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/10/19/development-without-freedom 
[hereinafter ETHIOPIA REPORT]. 
4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REHAB ARCHIPELAGO; FORCED LABOR AND 
OTHER ABUSES IN DRUG DETENTION CENTERS IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM 26, 
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been used to fuel egregious human rights abuses, either directly 
through projects implemented by USAID, or indirectly through 
politicization of USAID funds by local governments. While several 
proposals have been made to implement sweeping changes to USAID’s 
structure, including more effective monitoring of USAID project 
funding, the suggested remedies do not truly address the underlying 
problems, have not been put into effect, and in any case, will likely 
take several years to enact.5 Further, the few reforms that have been 
implemented—while helpful—do not ultimately target the 
fundamental issues that have led to human rights violations.6 
The most alarming aspect of this problem is that there are 
currently no avenues of redress or accountability for victims of 
USAID funding.7 There are no statutory schemes in the U.S. that can 
provide any form of recognition, let alone remedy, for these victims.8 
Compounding this issue, USAID is not only unaware of the conditions 
in these countries after funding has been delivered, but it also has 
inadequate means of rectifying this deficiency. Many proposed 
solutions center around a complete overhaul of USAID, which would 
take a significant amount of time and resources, while doing nothing 
to help current victims. The incremental internal changes now 
occurring within USAID similarly leave victims without a true 
remedy. Therefore, a more immediate solution is needed to address 
these victims’ rights, while the underlying structural changes can be 
set in motion over the next several years.  
This Note proposes an alternative solution that involves a limited 
amendment to USAID’s mandate in the Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA),9 rather than a time-intensive reimagining of the entire statute. 
 
30–40 (2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/09/07/rehab-archipelago [hereinafter 
VIETNAM REPORT]. 
5. See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 128 (suggesting that USAID be 
structurally separated from the State Department); John Waggoner, 
Congress Debates US Aid Reforms, FRONTLINES (USAID, Washington, 
D.C.), Sept. 2009, at 1, 14 (outlining a proposed bill to reform USAID 
internally through evaluation centers and increased training). 
6. See McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2 (noting 
the Obama Administration’s initial steps to reforming USAID, including 
efforts to lengthen funding cycles and alter funding patterns). 
7. See id. (“Today, no specific mechanisms exist to prevent harm to 
indigenous people or forcible displacement of local groups in conjunction 
with economic, agricultural, mining, or infrastructure programs.”). 
8. None of the discussions on proposed changes to USAID include how to 
address the immediate impact on victims of USAID funding. See, e.g., 
Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 127; Waggoner, supra note 5, at 1, 14.  
9. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1961)). 
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Specifically, it argues that creating a private right of action within the 
FAA itself is the most effective means of giving victims a voice and 
an opportunity for redress until USAID can undergo the necessary 
structural changes that will prevent such abuses in the future. Such a 
right of action already exists in several U.S. administrative agencies, 
and Congress should extend that practice to USAID, especially given 
the nature of the human rights abuses. Further, the idea of victim 
and public participation in litigation has a long history in both 
American and international jurisprudence. Additionally, the creation 
of a private right of action will serve another function for USAID: it 
will have a monitoring effect so that USAID can become aware of the 
types of violations that are taking place. By allowing groups and 
NGOs that have the access and capability of reaching the areas where 
these violations are occurring to present a case, USAID would be 
made aware of issues and problems that they otherwise were 
incapable of realizing. Most importantly, such an amendment to the 
FAA would provide the only legal recourse for foreign victims of 
USAID funding, as no other statute or mechanism exists to achieve 
this purpose—in particular, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) would not apply. 
While the future of U.S. foreign assistance ultimately depends on 
comprehensive changes in USAID’s structure and organization, a 
limited amendment to the FAA would be more expedient in 
addressing the immediate problem of human rights violations. 
However, because it is essentially USAID’s institutional weaknesses 
that lead to the human rights abuses, a thorough assessment of these 
long-term problems and solutions through institutional reform is 
necessary to determine why such an amendment is comparably more 
efficient and effective. Further, the broader changes must also be 
considered to ultimately improve USAID’s effectiveness and prevent 
further and future human rights abuses.  
This Note analyzes the perennial problems afflicting USAID, the 
resultant human rights abuses, and possible solutions to address these 
issues. Part II provides the historical background and overview of 
USAID’s institutional problems, as well as an examination of the 
human rights abuses in Ethiopia and Vietnam. Part III reviews the 
practice of public and victim participation in U.S. administrative 
agencies, including issues of standing to challenge administrative 
agency actions. Part IV looks to the rationale of the Victim 
Participation Clause in the Rome Statute for the International 
Criminal Court as guidance for creating similar rights in the FAA. 
Part V discusses the Alien Tort Statute and its limitations. Part VI 
briefly notes the limited scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Part 
VII provides an analysis of how public participation doctrine can be 
applied in the context of USAID and proposes the components of a 
statutory amendment to the FAA as well as potential long-term 
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solutions to be considered in addition to the amendment. Part VIII 
concludes and summarizes the analysis.  
II. USAID’S Background, Problems, and Resulting 
Human Rights Violations 
A. Historical Problems with USAID and the Issue of Aid Effectiveness 
USAID is the primary administrative agency that oversees the 
delivery and implementation of development assistance programs 
overseas.10 Congress mandated USAID through the FAA in 1961, and 
it has remained the principal development arm of the U.S.11 While the 
U.S. has the highest disbursement levels of any other donor country,12 
with USAID supporting $17.8 billion in projects in 2013,13 USAID 
faces a two-tier problem. The first tier relates to the underlying 
institutional issues that involve USAID’s organization and structure. 
These fundamental problems lead to the second, more immediate tier 
of human rights violations that result from the misuse of USAID 
funding.  
The FAA was enacted “[t]o promote the foreign policy, security, 
and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the 
world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and 
external security, and for other purposes.”14 These goals translate into 
U.S. foreign assistance program initiatives designed to “support U.S. 
national security and promote economic growth, poverty reduction, 
and humanitarian relief abroad.”15 During the Cold War, USAID 
enjoyed autonomy and considerable resources, and was on the whole 
effective in achieving its stated goals.16 Specifically, USAID 
 
10. USAID History, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaid-
history (last updated May 15, 2014).  
11. See id.; Foreign Assistance Act § 102. 
12. Aid to Poor Countries Slips Further As Governments Tighten  
Budgets, OECD (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernm
entstightenbudgets.htm (stating that the U.S. remains the largest donor, 
contributing a total of $30.5 billion in 2012). 
13. U.S. Agency for International Development, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, 
http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/Agency_USAID.aspx?FY=2014
&tabID=tab_sct_Peace_Disbs&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2014). 
14. Foreign Assistance Act, 75 Stat. at 424. 
15. Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 124. 
16. See id. at 125; see also Kevin Baron, Gates: “Congress is part of the 
problem” in State, USAID Shortfalls, STRIPES CENTRAL BLOG (Aug. 23, 
2010), http://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central-
1.8040/gates-congress-is-part-of-the-problem-in-state-usaid-shortfalls-
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complemented the foreign influence of the State Department and 
Pentagon—USAID agents could more effectively address development 
issues because they had a greater integrated field presence in the 
target areas.17 They were able to establish contacts and interactions in 
more remote cities with civil-society leaders, government officials, 
local legislative agencies, businessmen, and ministries, ensuring both 
the effectiveness and sustainability of development programs.18  
Following the Cold War, however, USAID underwent 
organizational changes that resulted in a loss of independence and the 
assumption of a subordinate role.19 Because USAID was instituted in 
response to the Cold War, in the period after, several members of 
Congress no longer believed in its purpose.20 USAID functions and 
budget were now under the aegis of the U.S. State Department, which 
made USAID’s agenda secondary to the State Department’s.21 Upon 
losing its independent authority, USAID “lost staff, programmatic 
flexibility, and influence with Congress, other government 
departments, other aid donors, and recipient nations.”22 Because 
USAID became less effective as a result, multiple splinter agencies 
with similar development goals were established, none of which were 
consolidated or overseen by the USAID Administrator. These various 
groups work on competing or overlapping projects, and with little 
interaction or communication between them and USAID, foreign 
assistance projects have suffered from a lack of efficiency and 
representation; donors and recipients are unclear as to which entity is 
 
1.115680 (according to former U.S. Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, 
“[USAID] had been a huge player in our success in the Cold War”).  
17. See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 125. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. at 125–26; see also CLINTON-GORE ADMINISTRATION HISTORY 
PROJECT: USAID’S ROLE 1993-2001, at 1–2 (2000),  
available at http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research% 
20-%20Digital%20Library/ClintonAdminHistoryProject/81-90/Box%208 
7/1756250-united-states-agency-international-development-usaid-history-
during-clinton-administration.pdf.pdf (describing that after the Cold 
War, USAID fell prey to declining resources, changing relationships, and 
structural problems). 
20. See Roger Bate, The Trouble with USAID, 1 AMERICAN INTEREST 113, 
114 (2006) (recalling that a vocal opponent of USAID was Senator Jesse 
Helms who wanted USAID eliminated, opining that foreign aid was like 
“throwing money down foreign rat holes”). 
21. See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 128; see also Bate, supra note 20, at 
114 (stating that post-Cold War, USAID became accountable to the 
State Department). 
22. Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 125; see also Baron, supra note 16 
(citing former Defense Secretary Robert Gates as saying that there were 
16,000 USAID employees in 1993 and only 3,000 in 2006).   
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representing U.S. aid efforts.23 This “organizational chaos” has led to 
increased costs of implementation, which in turn delay 
implementation and reduce impact.24 In 2006, USAID was fully 
integrated under the State Department, forcing the USAID 
Administrator to oversee both the foreign assistance of the State 
Department, as well as USAID, despite the fact that these two 
agencies have different agendas and goals. The centralization of 
USAID’s function hindered its ability to reach recipient countries and 
tailor development programs to their specific needs—the very ability 
that made USAID effective during the Cold War.25  
Further, the importance of development aid in the U.S. has been 
downplayed, which has led to significant budget, staffing, and staff 
training cuts.26 Because maintaining a field presence in developing 
countries is integral to the effective implementation of USAID 
projects, staffing cuts that result in a reduced field presence are 
particularly harmful to USAID’s effectiveness.27 Specifically, such a 
limited connection to the developing countries naturally minimizes 
USAID’s oversight and monitoring capabilities to the effect that 
human rights abuses occur without USAID’s knowledge or 
accountability. On a deeper level, the resultant loss of trained 
manpower has effectively changed the foundation of USAID, 
transforming it “from a creative, proactive, and technically skilled 
organization focused on implementation to a contracting and grant-
making agency.”28 This growing bureaucratization has propelled 
 
23. See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 125–26. 
24. Id. at 126; see also Lack of Leadership at USAID Limits Effectiveness of 
U.S. Foreign Assistance, INTERACTION, (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www. 
interaction.org/article/lack-leadership-usaid-limits-effectiveness-us-
foreign-assistance (last updated Nov. 10, 2009) (“[T]his deficit in 
leadership has led to a rising trend in transferring development issues to 
other U.S. government agencies”).  
25. See Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 126. 
26. Id.; Bate, supra note 20, at 114 (2006); ANDREW NATSIOS, CTR. FOR 
GLOBAL DEV., THE CLASH OF THE COUNTER-BUREAUCRACY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 26–27 (2010), available at 
www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424271 (describing how 
the massive staffing cuts slowed down development projects in the field, 
and left technical experts “little time” to monitor and implement 
current programs). 
27. Cf. Bate, supra note 20, at 117–18. USAID employs the advice of 
several U.S. consultants in administering their programs, particularly in 
the area of global health policy. Commentators have found that 
“Western consultants are often ineffective because they lack detailed 
knowledge of local conditions,” and many do not visit the program’s 
site. Id. 
28. Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 127. 
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USAID down a spiral of ineffective policies and reduced flexibility and 
leverage.29  
Policymakers have suggested several structural changes that could 
mitigate many of these problems, though all these recommendations 
stem from an overhaul of the FAA to restore USAID’s autonomy and 
independence. USAID’s mandate has not been substantively amended 
since 1985.30 In 2009, former Senator John Kerry, as Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, attempted to refashion the FAA 
to specifically address the organizational, monitoring, and oversight 
problems that USAID was facing. The draft of the new bill 
incorporated several long-term solutions including a decentralized 
structure where USAID would reclaim independent or cabinet-level 
status, and an evaluation mechanism where USAID could assess a 
program’s social benefits and weaknesses prior to implementation.31 
However, due to budgetary constraints and the low-level priority that 
is placed on development issues,32 this reform attempt was killed in 
committee.33 Because these reforms were never passed or executed, 
USAID continues to experience the same problems of ineffectiveness 
that ultimately have led to human rights abuses.  
B. Human Rights Abuses Resulting from Misappropriated USAID 
Funds 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), a nonprofit NGO focusing on 
reporting human rights violations around the world,34 recently 
published two reports based on investigations in Ethiopia and 
Vietnam exposing various human rights abuses. While the reports 
found that the national governments in the respective countries are 
 
29. See id.; NATSIOS, supra note 26, at 26–27. 
30. Atwood et al., supra note 1, at 130; Waggoner, supra note 5, at 14. 
31. See Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009, 
S. 1524, 111th Cong. §§ 5, 6 (aiming to amend sections of the original 
Foreign Assistance Act to involve greater monitoring efforts and  
impact assessments) (2010); ADS Help Document: Brief on “Social  
Soundness Analysis,” USAID 1, 
http://www.usaidgems.org/Documents/ADS200HelpDoc_SocialSoundne
ssAnalysis.doc (last visited Dec. 30, 2014); CONNIE VEILLETTE, CTR. FOR 
GLOBAL DEV., THE FUTURE OF U.S. AID REFORM: RHETORIC, REALITY, 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A REPORT OF THE RETHINKING U.S. FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 27 (2009). 
32. See John Norris, Five Myths About Foreign Aid, WASH. POST  
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-04-
28/opinions/35231618_1_foreign-aid-foreign-assistance-act-aid-programs 
(stating that “[f]oreign aid has few domestic allies”).   
33. VEILLETTE, supra note 31, at 27. 
34. Human Rights Watch, Who We Are, http://www.hrw.org/node/75136 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014).  
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responsible for these abuses, HRW also discovered that USAID 
funding has been used to directly cause or facilitate these human 
rights violations.35  
1. Ethiopia 
As of 2009, USAID was supplying $530.9 million to Ethiopia 
through the World Bank project entitled the Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP). Executed in 2005, PSNP was designed to assist 
Ethiopia with its food shortage by supplying transfers of food or cash 
to households with no food security through public works, or through 
direct transfers to those who are unable to work.36  
According to fifty local residents in Ethiopia where PSNP funds 
were delivered, the ruling party was using the PSNP money as 
leverage to gain and maintain political control. Several members of 
opposition political parties were excluded from the program.37 USAID 
funds that were intended for crucial food needs are held hostage by 
the Ethiopian government unless intended recipients pledge loyalty 
and support to the ruling party and cease any opposition movements 
or beliefs.38  Some locals who attempted to report this abuse to 
independent investigators or to foreign journalists were detained, and 
in some cases, the journalists themselves were detained and 
threatened with deportation.39 
Moreover, victims suffering from these abuses are disenfranchised 
and lack domestic avenues of recourse in their home countries. While 
PSNP provides for a local Appeals Committee and council that are 
intended to deal with complaints related to the PSNP program, locals 
attest that these bodies are controlled by the ruling party and often 
systematically deny or refuse to entertain claims challenging the 
government’s actions and behavior.40 Beyond the corruption concerns, 
the appeals structure also suffers from a lack of clarity and efficiency; 
 
35. McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2. 
36. ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 31; see also USAID, Productive 
Safety Net Program (PSNP), http://ethiopia.usaid.gov/programs/feed-
future-initiative/projects/productive-safety-net-program-psnp (last 
updated Jan. 3, 2013).  
37. ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 40–41. 
38. Id. at 72; McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2; see 
also Jeffrey Gettleman, Repression is Alleged Before Vote in  
Ethiopia, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/world/africa/21ethiopia.html?pag
ewanted=all&_r=0.  
39. ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 43. 
40. See, e.g., ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 77; Beverly Jones, Leading 
Civil Society up the Governance Path: Civil Society as ‘Instrument of 
Democratic Structural Adjustment’ –A Case Study from Ethiopia (Nov. 
15, 2008). 
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an Overseas Development Institute report found that 79 percent of 
local Ethiopian people did not utilize the Appeals Committee either 
because they believed there was no one to complain to, or if they did 
know of the existence of the Committee, they were not aware of the 
appropriate person to contact.41 
HRW identifies two primary problems that lead to these abuses. 
First, due to the repressive nature of the government and remote 
locations of the areas where the USAID funding is being sent, 
information and communication are severely hindered, and detection 
of politicization is difficult. Second, USAID lacks adequate monitoring 
and evaluation safeguards. A Development Assistance Group report 
stated that a USAID fact-finding mission in 2009 found no evidence of 
discrimination in this program, despite widespread testimony that it 
was occurring.42 Even other neutral international organizations such 
as the Overseas Development Institute and the International Food 
Policy Research Institute reported that PSNP funds were used as a 
political tool of repression as early as 2006.43 While some did not find 
that the problem was pervasive throughout the system, they still 
encouraged the crucial necessity of long-term transparency efforts to 
increase effectiveness and detect, correct, and prevent abuses.44 A 
donor official of PSNP stated that the politicization of funds was “not 
a criterion for monitoring” and that he doubted the “rapid response 
teams would pick it up.”45 HRW proposes solutions to improve 
monitoring capability, essentially reiterating the need for independent 
monitoring without the involvement of the Ethiopian government, 
with the express purpose of detecting politicization risk. It also 
recommends corrective measures beyond heightened monitoring, 
which include ways to condition receipt of funding on compliance with 
human rights standards and other measures.46 
2. Vietnam 
Similarly in Vietnam, HRW discovered that USAID funding has 
been misused to directly lead to human rights violations. The 
program at issue is the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR), through which nearly $102 million was expected to 
 
41. OVERSEAS DEV. INST., TARGETING ETHIOPIA’S PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET 
PROGRAMME (PNSP) 26, 57 (2006), available at www.odi.org.uk/ 
resources/docs/3966.pdf; ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 77.  
42. ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 44. 
43. See OVERSEAS DEV. INST., supra note 41, at 50; ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 44–45. 
44. ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 44–45. 
45. Id. at 76. 
46. Id. at 9, 78. 
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be delivered to Vietnam in 2011.47 One of USAID’s aims in this 
program was to provide training assistance to staff at twenty drug 
detention centers, including how to conduct HIV and TB screening 
and care, drug addiction and relapse prevention services, and 
addiction counseling.48 Despite these efforts, the centers have been the 
site of involuntary or arbitrary detention, with no due process or 
method for appeal, forced labor, poor working conditions, and 
physical abuse as punishment.49  
HRW noticed similar problems between Vietnam and the 
Ethiopia cases; namely, USAID’s deficient monitoring and evaluation 
capacities. While PEPFAR expressly states that programs should be 
implemented consistent with human rights obligations, and that U.S. 
law prohibits the use of aid funding to violate workers’ rights, 
USAID’s monitoring and evaluating indicators do not include any 
human rights indicators—rather, they encompass only those relating 
to staff training procedures.50 Further, USAID never responded to 
HRW’s requests to obtain more information about the human rights 
conditions of the drug detention centers.51 HRW proposes that stricter 
monitoring and evaluation is necessary to specifically account for 
human rights abuses and their causes.52 In addition, as in Ethiopia, 
detainees in Vietnam were not informed of any process through which 
they could challenge or appeal detention center decisions, despite the 
fact that Vietnam does have an administrative appeals ordinance.53  
C. Limitations in the FAA 
The various sections of the FAA reveal in greater depth USAID’s 
purpose, its engagement in several projects, and how it intends to 
achieve its goals. The statute is replete with provisions expressing 
Congress’ commitment to providing assistance to achieve sustainable 
development in developing countries. In furtherance of this objective, 
it enumerates five major principles that USAID intends to uphold, 
including “the encouragement of development processes in which 
 
47. VIETNAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 75; The U.S. President’s Emergency 
Plan for Aids Relief, Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Vietnam, 
USA.GOV, http://www.pepfar.gov/countries/vietnam/index.htm (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2014).  
48. VIETNAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 76. 
49. Id. at 26, 30–40. 
50. Id. at 84. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 25, 31 & n.84.  
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individual civil and economic rights are respected and enhanced”54 
and “the promotion of good governance through combating corruption 
and improving transparency and accountability.”55 Further, it 
specifies several “mandatory” principles (i.e., indicated through the 
use of “shall”) that various actors must follow, including the USAID 
Administrator and the President, when implementing any projects. 
There are many requirements on monitoring,56 reporting,57 supporting 
anti-corruption efforts,58 and supporting human rights,59 indicating a 
pervasive intent to make USAID transparent and accountable, and to 
comply with international obligations on human rights. However, 
while these are compulsory, the act does not prescribe any particular 
method for fulfilling these responsibilities; they read more like 
hortatory guidelines rather than stipulations. USAID’s current 
structural problems and the existence of human rights abuses confirm 
the ineffectiveness of these provisions—the situations in Ethiopia and 
Vietnam are cases where civil and economic rights are disrespected, 
and where both countries’ governments have exhibited corruptive 
behavior—all in direct contravention of USAID’s purpose. Moreover, 
the FAA contains no provisions allowing a party to challenge or 
review any projects. 
An examination of the two-tier problem exposes the conflict in 
determining an adequate solution to USAID’s problem. The first-level 
of institutional problems reveal that USAID is in need of complete 
restructuring and reform, chiefly in the form of a new mandate in the 
 
54. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 101(3), 75 Stat. 
424 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1961)) (citing from the “General 
Policy” section). 
55. Id. § 101(5) (citing from the “General Policy” section). 
56. See, e.g., id. § 104A(d)(4) & (d)(7) (requiring monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms for projects combatting HIV/AIDs); § 128(b) 
(stating that monitoring is necessary to ensure that the intended poor 
recipients receive loan assistance); § 131 (calling for the USAID 
Administrator to manage a monitoring system in the Microdevelopment 
Grant Assistance project). 
57. See, e.g., id. § 489 (requiring the President to report to Congress on 
whether the stated goals have been met in the International Narcotics 
Control project); § 498 (demanding a similar reporting requirement in 
its Assistance for Independent States of Soviet Union project).  
58. See, e.g., id. § 129(b)(3) (emphasizing anti-corruption in Foreign Banks 
projects); § 133 (encouraging “good governance” programs); § 490(b)(2) 
(obligating the U.S. to consider whether a country has taken measures 
to prevent corruption prior to engaging in bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation).  
59. See, e.g., id. § 502B (reiterating the U.S.’ obligations under the U.N. 
Charter and its general commitment to promoting and respecting 
human rights).  
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FAA. However, given the failed attempt to rewrite the FAA in 2009, 
coupled with declining expertise and staff, it is unlikely that this 
attempt will be resuscitated soon. The second-level of problems in the 
form of human rights abuses suggests that USAID needs more staff 
and enhanced monitoring and enforcement capability—changes that 
would require a new FAA mandate. Due to this conflict, an 
alternative solution needs to be offered, one that would not 
necessarily involve a broad overhaul of the FAA, which would likely 
take several years. A limited amendment to the FAA, allowing for a 
recognition of victims’ rights and a possible course of legal action in 
U.S. federal courts would specifically address the issue of human 
rights without reaching the extensive structural reforms. Because 
victims have no domestic avenue of legal recourse,60 coupled with the 
fact that USAID has grown detached from its intended beneficiaries 
(and now victims) overseas, Congress must create a connection to 
these victims through the U.S. court system. 
III. Private Rights of Action, Standing, and Public 
Participation Doctrine in Administrative Agencies 
In order to provide USAID victims or their representatives access 
to U.S. courts, their injury must be a legal harm cognizable in the 
courts, and then the victims must themselves have actually, 
personally suffered this harm. The latter requirement, which is tested 
under standing doctrine, would be particularly difficult to meet in a 
case involving USAID victims—absent a private right of action—for 
several reasons: there are numerous potential parties that represent 
majority rather than minority interests; they are citizens of foreign 
countries; and resolution of their problems may implicate prudential 
concerns such as generalized grievances and political question 
doctrine. The following section explores the mechanics of a private 
right of action, and how its existence can facilitate or overcome 
barriers to standing. Additionally, it examines standing doctrine and 
its expansion in the context of challenges to administrative agencies, 
showing that the concept of public participation in these cases has 
been upheld both to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights, and to aid or improve 
agency function. Ultimately, this body of case law serves as a legal 
basis that supports the idea of USAID victim participation through 
the creation of a private right of action in the FAA. 
A. Statutory Rights and Standing Doctrine 
In order to successfully bring a claim in a U.S. court, parties must 
have both a cause of action, or a “legal harm” that carries entitlement 
 
60. See ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 77; VIETNAM REPORT, supra note 
4, at 25, 31 & n.84. 
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to relief, as well as standing under the U.S. Constitution, which 
requires “actual harm.”61 Specifically, parties attempting to challenge 
federal agency action can do so in one of three ways. The first, which 
will be discussed further in Part C of this section, is parties can raise 
a claim using Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act,62 
which provides a general cause of action to challenge agency decisions 
where the plaintiff is aggrieved or adversely affected within the 
meaning of the relevant statute, and where the statute itself is silent 
on the availability of judicial review.63 The second is when a 
particular regulatory scheme contains a specific provision allowing 
judicial review.64 Third, if the governing statute of the agency 
contains a private right of action, then the statute defines a cause of 
action, and the parties may act through that vehicle.65 By creating a 
private right of action to enforce statutory provisions, Congress also 
effectively creates, or recognizes, a statutory right for which a legal 
remedy is available if the right is violated.66 An express private right 
of action contains the following components: the persons able to bring 
suit; those who are potentially liable; forum for the suit; and the 
potential remedy available.67  
 
61. See Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s 
Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 178 (2012) (“To win a 
federal lawsuit, a plaintiff needs both legal harm (cause of action) and 
an injury-in-fact . . .); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and 
Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 280–81 (2008). The U.S. 
Supreme Court also reiterated this point in Tennessee Electric Power 
Company v. Tennessee Valley Authority when it held that while the 
alleged injury, competition, would occur, it was not the basis of a cause 
of action because the damage was “not consequent upon the violation of 
any right recognized by law.” 306 U.S. 118, 135–35, 137. (1939). 
62. Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 
501 et seq.) 
63. Regional Mgmt. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 186 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 
1999); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882–83 (1990). 
64. Legal Servs. Corp., 186 F.3d at 467 (Murnaghan, C.J., concurring); 
Hoefler v. Babbitt, 139 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1998). 
65. Legal Servs. Corp., 186 F.3d at 461; Lujan, 497 U.S. at 882. 
66. This proposition has received particular affirmation in the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, though these cases have not involved federal agencies. 
See, e.g., Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 2014), 
petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 1171 (U.S. May 1, 2014) (No. 13-
1339) (“Congress’s creation of a private cause of action to enforce a 
statutory provision implies that Congress intended the enforceable 
provision to create a statutory right.”); Fulfillment Servs., Inc. v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 2008). 
67. Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. CV 09-08950, 2010 WL 1444878, at 
*7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010), aff’d 722 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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Even if Congress were to create this right, parties would still have 
to cross the justiciability barrier by meeting the constitutional 
requirements for standing—they would have to show that they indeed 
suffered a particularized, redressable injury resulting from a violation 
of this protected right.  Standing is a “threshold determination that a 
particular plaintiff is entitled to engage the judicial machinery to 
adjudicate the merits of a dispute involving an otherwise justiciable 
issue.”68 It consists of two essential components that a plaintiff must 
overcome to present a case. The first originates from Article III of the 
Constitution, requiring that the claim is a “case” or “controversy,” 
meaning that the plaintiff must allege at a minimum (1) an injury-in- 
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s alleged wrongful 
conduct, and (3) that lends itself to some form of redress.69 The injury 
must be actual, “concrete,” and particularized in that the injury 
represents a “minority” interest, not one that appeals generally to the 
public.70 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted standing when 
the plaintiff was “among the injured,” even if many people were 
affected by the alleged harm.71 While this ruling may seem at odds 
with the Article III requirement, standing was maintained because the 
injury was still sufficiently personal. 
While determining the legal harm for the cause of action and the 
actual harm for standing purposes may seem like the same inquiry, 
they are in fact distinct. Standing is necessary, but not sufficient, for 
a cause of action;72 there can only be standing if a plaintiff alleges a 
violation of a legally protected right.73 Thus, merely having a legal  
68. Kevin A. Coyle, Comment, Standing of Third Parties to Challenge 
Administrative Agency Actions, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1067–68 (1988). 
69. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560–61 (1992); see also Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); Hessick, supra note 61, at 276; Antonin Scalia, 
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1981).  
70. Ex Parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. 
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974). 
71. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563; see Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 
205, 208–12 (1972) (recognizing that an individual has a personal 
interest in living in a racially integrated community, and the denial of 
that interest is a legally cognizable injury that can serve as the basis for 
standing). 
72. Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and 
Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2001). 
73. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 255, 256 (“[T]he quest for a legal right on which to 
ground standing is a tautology, since the grant of standing itself 
manifests a legal right.”); see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 4 COMMENTARIES 
*23 (“[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit 
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.”). 
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right that has been violated does not necessarily imply that a party 
has suffered an actual injury for standing purposes, nor does suffering 
an actual injury indicate a legal harm has been violated or that there 
is a cause of action. Courts have reaffirmed that legal harms can be 
congressionally created through private rights of action, holding that 
Congress can “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries 
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law”74 
and “create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of 
which can confer standing to use even where the plaintiff would have 
suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute.”75 
Courts have curbed this power by ensuring that Congress cannot 
confer standing by statute; it can only recognize—or “elevate”—de 
facto legal harms that can form the basis for a subsequent standing 
determination.76 Thus, parties alleging violation of statutory rights 
would still need to meet the Article III requirements by proving they 
suffered an actual injury beyond the violation of the statutory right.     
However, in some instances where the alleged actual injury 
derived from a statutorily created private right of action, courts have 
essentially found that the violation of the right itself sufficed as the 
requisite injury-in-fact for standing. The U.S. Supreme Court has not 
outright stated that the violation of the statutory right constituted 
the actual injury; the Court found injury-in-fact based on the 
consequences of the right being violated. For example, in FEC v. 
Akins,77 the Court granted standing to a group of voters who claimed 
they were “aggrieved” by a Federal Election Commission decision that 
determined a certain committee was not subject to political 
committee reporting requirements under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act.78 The Court held that standing was appropriate 
because the Act created a right to information, a right otherwise 
unavailable without the statute, which was violated when the FEC 
allowed the committee to avoid reporting.79 While it appears that the  
74. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. An example of such an instance when Congress 
“elevated” a de facto injury occurred in Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., where the court granted standing to two white residents of an 
apartment complex to challenge the owner’s discrimination against 
black residents because the Civil Rights Act of 1968 created a right to 
be free from the harmful consequences of discrimination. 409 U.S. 205, 
210–11 (1972). 
75. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975). 
76. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (stating that increasing the types of injuries that 
can confer standing does not mean that the Article III injury 
requirement can be bypassed); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION § 2.3 (4th ed. 2003). 
77. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
78. Id. at 14–15. 
79. Id. 
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Court was suggesting the violation of the right to information was the 
injury-in-fact, its analysis focused instead on the consequence of the 
violation—the deprivation of information—and found that to be the 
actual injury.80  
Nonetheless, this subtle difference demonstrates that the line 
between a violation of the statutory right and the actual injury is not 
always clear. Indeed, as one legal scholar concludes, where private 
rights of action are involved, the injury-in-fact analysis is 
“superfluous;” the violation of the right itself is an injury sufficient for 
standing.81 Several recent cases in the Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts 
of Appeals uphold this view.82 One of the Ninth Circuit cases, Robins 
v. Spokeo, Inc., for which a certiorari petition is currently pending, 
confirmed that the “violation of a statutory right is usually a 
sufficient injury in fact to confer standing.”83 This conclusion almost 
suggests that Congress can confer standing when creating private 
rights of action; however, the Ninth Circuit did recognize limitations 
on Congress’ power to do so. First, it acknowledged that the other 
Article III requirements, causation and redressability, still apply so 
that the traditional standing analysis has not been entirely 
displaced.84 Second, it reiterated the analysis from a Sixth Circuit 
case, holding that a plaintiff must still be “among the injured” where 
 
80. Id. 
81. Hessick, supra note 61, at 303–04. Hessick notes, however, that in an 
effort not to abrogate the injury-in-fact requirement, the Supreme Court 
has always found some way to insert the traditional analysis, or find 
some alternative justification, in cases where it would otherwise seem 
that the violation of a statutory right sufficed for the actual injury. 
Similarly, others have argued that none of the standing requirements 
should apply where procedural rights are created via statute. Procedural 
rights are those that provide an entitlement to have a government 
agency perform certain process-based or procedural duties, such as 
preparing an environmental impact statement. See Lee & Ellis, supra 
note 61, at 174 & n.21, 175, 191. Justice Scalia stated this view in a 
footnote from the majority opinion of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
essentially finding that Congress can alter some of the Article III 
standing requirements where procedural rights cases are involved. See 
Lee & Ellis, supra note 61, at 191. 
82. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for 
cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 1171 (U.S. May 1, 2014) (No. 13-1339); 
Fulfillment Servs., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 614 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Beaudry v. Telecheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 
2009); In re Carter, 553 F.3d 979 (6th Cir. 2009). 
83. See Spokeo, 742 F.3d at 412. 
84. Id. at 414 (asserting that while the two other elements of Article III 
standing still apply, the analysis “boil[s] down to ‘essentially’ the injury-
in-fact prong”). 
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his statutory rights were violated, and that the injury must be 
“individual, rather than collective, harm.”85  
The significance of this trend in cases involving private rights of 
action is that while standing remains a separate concept, courts 
nonetheless seem to grant standing more readily where a violation of 
private rights is involved. Naturally, the language of a cause of action 
is crucial in determining which parties may actually bring suit, and 
moreover, “the scope of the cause of action determines the scope of 
the implied statutory right”86—meaning the wording of the cause of 
action defines the nature and extent of the injury for which standing 
can be conferred. In spite of these variables, a private right of action 
carries several advantages; namely the recognition of new legal rights, 
of which the mere violation may allow entry to a court.  
In challenges to agency action, there are three formulations or 
inquiries through which a court can determine whether the 
particularized injury requirement of Article III has been satisfied. The 
plaintiff must claim he personally suffered a “legal wrong” as a direct 
result of agency action, and that the law was specifically designed to 
prevent that harm;87 or he falls within the definition of “adversely 
affected” or “aggrieved party” under the various governing statutes 
that created the administrative agencies;88 or with respect to the APA 
cause of action, his interest falls within the “zone of interests” that 
the substantive statute seeks to protect.89 The second means forms the 
basis for statutory review cases: if the statute created a duty that the 
agency must perform for the benefit of someone like the plaintiff, and 
the agency disregards this duty without a sufficient reason, then the 
 
85. Id. at 413 (citing Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 707); see also Scalia, supra note 
69, at 886, 895 (opining that courts “should not be inclined to assume 
congressional designation of a ‘minority group’ so broad that it 
embraces virtually the entire population”). 
86. Spokeo, 742 F.3d at 413. 
87. Scalia, supra note 69, at 895. 
88. Id. at 895; Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: 
An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 428 
(1974) (explaining that an action brought pursuant to a statute is 
considered “statutory review” and allows “any party in interest” or “a 
person aggrieved or adversely affected” to seek review).  
89. Scalia, supra note 69, at 895; Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. 
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (stating that in addition to Article 
III requirements, the question of standing is “whether the interest 
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone 
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question”).  
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plaintiff is entitled to relief.90 These types of cases tend to be more 
effective when challenging agency action.91  
The second component of standing consists of “prudential 
limitations” to standing that the court imposes on itself to foreclose 
consideration of a claim that otherwise satisfies the Article III 
standing requirements.92 These include the general prohibition on the 
ability of a litigant to raise another person’s legal rights (i.e., third-
party standing), the rule “barring adjudication of generalized 
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative 
branches” (i.e., separation of powers and political question doctrine), 
and “the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint falls within the zone 
of interests protected by the law invoked.”93 As discussed infra pages 
656–59, a private right of action often preempts any prudential 
concerns a court may have. 
B. Public Interest Representation in U.S. Administrative Agencies 
The following cases show the development of the doctrine of 
standing in the context of federal regulatory agencies (i.e., those 
regulating commerce, energy, and communication). They expose not 
just the doctrinal requirements of standing, but also the courts’ 
growing interest in public interest litigation that can ultimately be 
analogized for agencies such as USAID—cases where the public 
interest was successfully litigated reveal which components are 
necessary to create a form of recourse for victims of USAID funding.94 
Giving citizens of foreign countries and their representatives 
access to the U.S. judicial system to challenge USAID action may 
seem outside the province of the courts. In actuality, however, the 
 
90. See Albert, supra note 88, at 429–30 (describing three cases involving 
the Interstate Commerce Commission that demonstrate this approach; 
namely Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 267 (1924), wherein 
standing was granted because the legal injury was one specifically 
contemplated by statutory mandate). 
91. Cf. Hessick, supra note 61, at 293 (“Although statutes placed duties on 
administrative agencies, those statutes did not create rights in 
individuals. Under the legal-interest standard, individuals factually 
harmed by agency action had no recourse in the courts, and the 
judiciary was largely unable to address unlawful agency conduct.”). 
92. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see also Scalia, supra note 69, 
at 885. Prudential limitations are discussed infra pp. 656–59. 
93. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 12 (2004). 
94. In terms of the Article III standing requirements, the focus of this 
discussion will be on the “injury-in-fact” element—whether plaintiffs 
have a private legal right that if violated by an agency, would create 
such an injury. For more information on these other requirements, see 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 
13 (6th ed. 2002).   
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idea of extending participation rights in agency decisions and judicial 
review to a wider set of parties and interests dates back to the mid-
twentieth century. During that time, courts sought to increase 
oversight and accountability of agencies, and thus began to take a 
more expansive view of both participation rights and standing.95 
Before then participation in agency adjudication was extremely 
restricted—generally only private parties whose liberty or property 
interests were affected by agency action were allowed to participate.96 
With respect to participation rights, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a 
rapid growth of advocacy groups in areas of civil rights, health and 
safety, and the environment, among others.97 The courts found that 
these groups should be entitled to participation rights in agency 
decision-making, thus contributing to the formation of public policy.98 
Giving a voice to these groups actually served the public interest 
more effectively than the original closed-door protocols of agency 
action.99 The prior model of allowing only private parties whose 
liberty or property interests were affected by agency action to 
participate was too restrictive, and did not allow agencies to function 
in the public’s best interest as they had intended.100 Thus, the 
involvement of public parties has the practical effect of facilitating 
certain agency functions; it is the mechanism that creates a liaison 
between the agency and the public that the agency is designed to 
serve. 
Early cases began developing this expansive doctrine not just by 
gradually including more types of parties and injuries, but also by 
 
95. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 305 (11th ed. 2011) (“This restrictive view 
of the ‘relevant’ private voices was changed as part of a legal, social and 
political transformation during the 1960s and 1970s. . . . Government 
was called upon to take an affirmative role in ensuring social justice and 
enhancing physical and economic well-being.”). 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 306 (stating that there was a “new emphasis on empowering 
otherwise underrepresented voices to participate meaningfully in the 
crafting of public policy”). 
99. See id. (observing that as the government began to expand their 
regulatory agendas, “questions were being raised about the ability of the 
administrative process, as traditionally structured, to in fact discern the 
‘public interest’”). 
100. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1759–62 (1975) (“The expansion of the 
traditional model to afford participation rights in the process of agency 
decision and judicial review to a wide variety of affected interests must 
ultimately rest on the premise that such procedural changes will be an 
effective and workable means of assuring improved agency decisions.”). 
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interpreting the statutory language at issue as encompassing both 
economic and non-economic injuries as a basis for complaint.101 A 
seminal Second Circuit case marking the transition from economic 
injuries to non-economic injuries and the recognition of the public’s 
rights, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power 
Commission,102 held that nonprofit conservation associations had 
standing for a claim to prevent implementation of the Federal Power 
Commission’s (FPC) storage hydroelectric project in the Hudson 
River area, in order to protect the aesthetic, conservational, and 
recreational purposes of this area. Petitioners raised their claim under 
Section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, which is the judicial review 
portion of the substantive statute creating the FPC.103  
In deciding that these non-economic interests were protected legal 
rights, the Court looked to both the language and purpose of this 
statute, asserting that it is the court’s duty “to see to it that the 
[FPC]’s decisions receive that careful consideration which the statute 
contemplates.”104 Two key sections informed the Court’s decision to 
recognize the plaintiffs’ injuries. The first was the judicial review 
section under which the claim was brought, which states that “[a]ny 
party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued 
by the [FPC] may obtain a review of such order in the United States 
Court of Appeals. . . .”105 To determine the meaning of “aggrieved” 
within the context of the statute, the Court referenced Section 10(a) 
of the Federal Power Act,106 which states the conditions that the FPC 
must follow when instigating a project—including, inter alia, that it 
be “best adapted . . . for other beneficial public uses . . . and 
recreational and other purposes.”107 Thus, part of the FPC’s 
obligations is to consider “recreational and other purposes” of its 
projects, and if it neglects this duty, then a party may be “aggrieved” 
by this inaction, thereby entitling him to judicial review. In finding 
that the interplay of these two sections essentially created a statutory 
legal right protecting recreational rights, the Court kept in line with 
previous decisions involving similar claims under the Federal Power 
 
101. See Note, The Law of Administrative Standing and the Public Right of 
Intervention, 1967 WASH. U. L. Q. 416, 423–24 (1967) (stating that 
generally, only economic interests and electrical interference cases 
involving the FCC were recognized to accord standing in challenging 
administrative agencies); Hessick, supra note 61, at 289. 
102. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). 
103. 16 U.S.C. § 825/(b). 
104. 354 F.2d at 612. 
105. 16 U.S.C. § 825/(b) (emphasis added); 354 F.2d at 615. 
106. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1).  
107. Id. 
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Act.108 Moreover, the Court emphasized the importance of the express 
statutory language in that it “may create new interests or rights and 
thus give standing to one who would otherwise be barred by the lack 
of a ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”109 
The Second Circuit also contemplated and ultimately rejected the 
FPC’s concern that such an expansion of standing might overburden 
the agency and hinder its operative efficacy by encouraging “literally 
thousands” to intervene and seek review in future proceedings.110 In 
addition to the fact that litigation is self-limiting through its 
prohibitive expenses and demands on time, the Federal Power Act 
nonetheless “creates no absolute right of intervention” because it 
allows the FPC to retain authority in limiting the parties eligible to 
intervene or seek review.111 The expansion of standing can thus 
protect both the public interest while still preserving the 
administrative efficiency of a federal agency. 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
followed the public interest approach in Scenic Hudson and 
acknowledged the importance of “audience participation” in Office of 
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. Federal 
 
108. See, e.g., Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 216 F.2d 509, 
511–12 (7th Cir. 1954) (recognizing that the public has rights in 
recreational, historic, and scenic resources under the Federal Power Act, 
and that recreation is a special right which is part of the “public 
interest” that must be considered); Washington Dep’t of Game v. Fed. 
Power Comm’n, 207 F.2d 391, 395 n.11 (9th Cir. 1953) (holding a 
nonprofit organization of students had standing to challenge an FPC 
dam project that would destroy fish because the “Federal Power Act 
seeks to protect non-economic as well as economic interests”).  
109. 354 F.2d at 615–16; see also Washington Dep’t of Game, 207 F.2d at 
398 n.11 (holding that petitioners are denied standing unless they fit 
into the “aggrieved” category as stated in the Federal Power Act); 
Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630, 632 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that the 
plaintiff had standing because he was “adversely affected” within the 
meaning of the statute so that he could challenge orders of the Federal 
Security Administrator). Moreover, the Court found that the FPC 
construed “aggrieved party” too narrowly; it observed that standing law 
is “complicated” and is “more or less determined by the specific 
circumstances of individual situations” (citing United States ex rel. 
Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953)). 
110. 354 F.2d at 617; see also Note, supra note 101, at 425–26. 
111. 354 F.2d at 617; 16 U.S.C. § 825(g)(a) (“In any proceeding before it, the 
[FPC], in accordance with such rules and regulations as it may 
prescribe, may admit as a party any interested State, State  
commission . . . or any other person whose participation in the 
proceeding may be in the public interest.” (emphasis added)); see Alston 
Coal Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 137 F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1943). 
(reiterating that intervention under this section is “permissive and rests 
in the sound discretion of the Commission”). 
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Communications Commission.112 While this case adopted a similar 
line of reasoning to earlier non-economic injury cases, it espoused a 
new doctrine that the right of intervention, which was already vested 
in competitors and major consumers, was now also vested in 
“representative groups of the general public.”113 Thus, this case 
continued the trend of expanding standing to additional parties, 
deeming them as interested parties also considered within the 
meaning of a statute. The Appellants in this case—the United Church 
of Christ and individual residents of Mississippi—filed a petition with 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prevent the FCC 
from renewing the license of a local radio station, WLBT.114 
Appellants claimed that WLBT failed to serve the public interest 
because it deliberately provided an unbalanced presentation of key 
issues involving race and religion. They alleged that by increasing the 
number of commercials and entertainment programming to prevent 
an opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on topics of 
social relevance, WLBT intentionally performed a public disservice.115 
Moreover, the imbalance in programming reflected a broader practice 
of discrimination and disrespect by minimizing exposure for African-
Americans.116  
Appellants asserted standing before the FCC117 on three bases: 
that they were individuals and organizations (1) that were denied a 
reasonable opportunity to share their viewpoints in violation of an 
FCC policy called the Fairness Doctrine, (2) that represented almost 
one half of WLBT’s potential audience, who were equally denied 
rights under the Fairness Doctrine and who were generally 
discriminated against in WLBT’s programs, and (3) that represented 
the total audience, regardless of race or religion, who were denied fair 
and balanced programming as required by the Fairness Doctrine.118 
The FCC implemented the Fairness Doctrine in a 1949 report,119 
placing a premium on the “right of the public to be informed, rather 
than any right on the part of the Government, any broadcast licensee 
or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own 
 
112. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).  
113. Note, supra note 101, at 424–25. 
114. 359 F.2d at 998. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Note that “standing” in this context means “administrative standing,” 
or standing to bring a claim before an administrative agency, not Article 
III standing before a court. 
118. 359 F.2d at 999. 
119. KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40009, FAIRNESS 
DOCTRINE: HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 2 (2011). 
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particular views on any matter.”120 Essentially, the Fairness Doctrine 
embodied a public interest standard that licensees must meet.121  
In contesting Appellants’ standing, the FCC argued that 
Appellants must show “a potential, direct, and substantial injury or 
adverse effect” resulting from the administrative action under 
consideration in order to have standing.122 Because the general 
listening public does not suffer a particular injury, they cannot have 
standing; furthermore, granting the public standing would impose 
heavy administrative burdens. The FCC maintained that the only 
two recognized grounds for standing were economic injury and 
electrical interference.123 The Court, however, refuted this argument, 
addressing the grounds for standing first. It stated that precedent did 
not dictate that these are the only two justifications for standing; 
moreover, where there is a statutory goal of public-interest 
broadcasting, courts have granted standing when parties are not 
acting to protect their own private interests, but rather are acting to 
vindicate public interest.124  
Specifically, in an earlier case, NBC v. FCC,125 the D.C. Circuit 
Court held that nonprofit radio stations had standing with the FCC, 
even though—as nonprofit agencies—they could not show economic 
injury. The Court reasoned that the statutory goal of public interest 
broadcasting necessarily recognized nonprofit stations as interested 
parties, and that a requirement of economic injury would necessarily 
deny them that interest. Thus the court recognized an alternative 
injury (electrical interference) as a basis for standing in addition to 
economic injury. It was ultimately the public interest objective that 
governed standing, not any particular or enumerated injury.126  
To further justify its reasoning, the D.C. Circuit appealed to three 
policy rationales. First, the entire purpose of standing is to provide a 
 
120. 359 F.2d at 999 n.5. 
121. Due to political opposition and constitutional issues, the Fairness 
Doctrine was eliminated in 1987 and officially removed in August 2011. 
See RUANE, supra note 119, at 2; Brooks Boliek, FCC Finally Kills Off 
Fairness Doctrine, POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2011 3:22 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2011/08/fcc-finally-kills-off-fairness-
doctrine-061851. 
122. 359 F.2d at 1000. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1001. 
125. 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff’d 319 U.S. 239 (1943).  
126. See Note, supra note 101, at 417 (emphasizing that in FCC v. Sanders 
Bros. Radio Station, the economic injury the radio station would likely 
suffer was “not itself a relevant issue before the Commission. It was 
relevant only in that it afforded Sanders standing for the purpose of 
litigating the public interest.”).  
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functional means through which only those parties with a “genuine 
and legitimate interest” could participate in a proceeding.127 In this 
case, the listening audience (and its representatives) had a clear stake 
in the actions of a broadcast licensee, which by its very nature is 
intended to serve and respond to the audience’s needs. The Supreme 
Court had previously applied this broader standard of “interest” for 
standing in multiple other cases involving parties challenging 
administrative agency actions.128  
Second, allowing the public to intervene in agency affairs has an 
additional benefit of facilitating agency functions. While the FCC is 
the ultimate authority in ensuring that broadcast licensees are serving 
public interests, it has an enormous number of duties, a wide 
jurisdiction, and insufficient staffing; it is unfeasible for the FCC to 
monitor all licensees within its purview.129  Given these constraints, 
public participation can mitigate these deficiencies. Public 
involvement is a type of monitoring mechanism, for “public response 
is the most reliable test of ideas and performance in broadcasting as 
in most areas of life . . . The Commission view is that we have 
traditionally depended on this public reaction rather than on some 
form of governmental supervision or ‘censorship’ mechanisms.”130 
Incorporating the public into the agency process thus helps the 
agency perform its statutory obligations. More importantly, the Court 
recognized that if the agency did not allow public participation, then 
it is likely the programming bias and discrimination would never have 
come to the FCC’s attention.131  
The federal courts also played a similar role in public interest 
litigation: “by providing a public right of intervention to complement 
the use of the standing cases to direct the discretion of the FCC [they] 
have further indicated their desire that the Commission utilize its 
broad discretion to serve the public interest.”132 Moreover, standing 
can be used as a “vehicle by which courts indicate to regulatory 
agencies what issues the courts consider relevant to a determination of 
 
127. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1002; see also Citizens Comm. for Hudson 
Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying the same 
standard).  
128. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1001; see also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio 
Station, 309 U.S. 470 at 475 (stating that an important element of 
public interest is to render “best practicable service to the community”); 
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (same). 
129. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1003–05. 
130. Id. at 1003. 
131. Id. at 1004. 
132. Note, supra note 101, at 433. 
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public interest.”133 Granting standing is indicative of what is in the 
public interest—while the legislature grants administrative agencies 
enough power to develop their own standards, when the FCC “fail[s] 
to provide meaningful standards, federal courts turn to standing 
doctrine as a means of instructing the FCC as to what issues are 
relevant to its consideration.”134  
Third, administrative agencies should capitalize on the public’s 
proactive interest in intervening in their decisions—by allowing the 
public to monitor and enforce the quality of broadcasting, agencies 
assume a more advantageous position: governmental power shifts into 
the “more detached role of arbiter rather than accuser.”135 Thus, in 
addition to honoring statutory obligations of serving the public 
interest, granting standing has more far-reaching effects in the 
performance of agency functions.  
With respect to the FCC’s second argument, that allowing public 
standing would create an unmanageable administrative burden, the 
Court echoed reasoning from Scenic Hudson stating that this 
potential problem can be corrected by “developing appropriate 
regulations by statutory rulemaking” and by implementing formal 
standards to discern which public parties and petitions state 
legitimate interests.136 The power to make these rules and standards 
should be conferred on the FCC, so that it is in a position to control 
the extent of its burden.137 The Court also noted that it is unlikely the 
less stringent standing requirements will overwhelm the FCC because 
the process of challenging agency action is inherently self-restricting. 
The costs of these proceedings are excessive enough to exclude many 
parties who would otherwise wish to participate.138  
Public participation thus has an important role in administrative 
agency proceedings: it is sometimes necessary for the agency to 
achieve it statutory purpose of serving the public interest, and it also 
assists the agency in performing other crucial functions.  
 
133. Id. at 430 (asserting that this use of standing doctrine was demonstrated 
in United Church). 
134. Id. at 430–31. 
135. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1003.  
136. Id. at 1005. Even though there are solutions to the administrative 
burdens, nonetheless the need to vindicate public interest is paramount. 
As Edmond Cahn astutely asserted, “[s]ome consumers need bread; 
others need Shakespeare; others need their rightful place in the national 
society—what they all need is processors of law who will consider the 
people’s needs more significant than administrative convenience.” 
Edmond Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
13 (1963).    
137. United Church, 359 F.2d at 1005. 
138. Id. at 1006. 
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C. Cases Under the Administrative Procedure Act 
Other cases falling under the category of public interest litigation 
include those claims raised under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),139 which provides a cause of action for certain challenges to 
agency decisions. This statute provides, in pertinent part: “[a] person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected 
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. . . .”140 While it is widely 
accepted that the APA contains a strong presumption in favor of 
judicial review,141 it is important to note that not all agency actions 
fall within the scope of the APA.142 The APA’s use of “legal wrong” 
implies a wrong that is already “cognizable in the courts,” where 
standing could already exist according to “traditional principles.”143 
Further, by incorporating the terms “adversely affected” or 
“aggrieved” “within the meaning of a relevant statute,” the APA is 
referring to specific statutes that recognize the rights of such parties 
to sue; thus, a claim under the APA must either be pursuant to some 
statute that uses those or substantially similar words,144 or it must be 
within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statute at 
issue.145  
Two major cases brought under the APA, Sierra Club v. 
Morton,146 where the plaintiffs were not granted standing, and United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP),147 where the petitioners were accorded standing, 
demonstrate the limitations in the APA’s applicability. The Supreme 
Court in Sierra Club clarified that a built-in caveat within the 
 
139. Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 
501 et seq.). 
140. Id. § 702 (emphasis added).  
141. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967); Bowen v. Mich. 
Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). 
142. Scalia, supra note 69, at 887, 889; see also Note, Statutory Preclusion of 
Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1976 DUKE 
L.J. 431, 433–35 (1976) (discussing the limiting effects of the APA).  
143. Scalia, supra note 69, at 887. 
144. Id. at 887–89. 
145. See Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 
153 (1970); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 395–96 (explaining 
that even where a statute makes no specific reference to “aggrieved” 
persons, one may still bring a claim under APA Section 702 as long as 
the interest sought to be protected is within the broader zone of 
interests of the statute). 
146. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
147. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).  
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language of the APA is that the plaintiff himself must be among the 
injured that have suffered from an agency action. The plaintiff Sierra 
Club was a membership corporation with a special interest in 
conservation and preservation of national parks, game refuges, and 
forests in the U.S.148 It aimed to challenge the construction of a ski 
resort and recreation area in a national game refuge and forest, 
alleging that the project would negatively impact the area’s natural 
beauty and ecology.149  
However, Sierra Club did not claim that the proposed ski resort 
would affect the club or its members, or even that the club used the 
area at all; rather, it was raising the complaint as a “public action” 
asserting it had a “special interest” in the general preservation of the 
area, regardless of whether it was personally affected.150 The Court 
held that despite broad readings of the APA’s requirements in the 
past,151 an immutable criterion to standing under the APA is that the 
party seeking review must be among the injured, even though the 
Court acknowledged that environmental interests are sufficient types 
of injuries.152 Because Sierra Club did not assert personalized injury 
according to a “relevant” statute as the APA requires, it was beyond 
the scope of the APA.  The Court further distinguished true “public 
action” cases as those in which Congress created an express statutory 
protection for the public’s interest, where plaintiffs could then obtain 
judicial review under the APA as “responsible representatives” of the 
public—even though they did not suffer injuries themselves, they 
suffered as representatives, which satisfied the personalized injury 
requirement for standing.153 Ultimately, for an APA action, a plaintiff 
 
148. 405 U.S. at 730.  
149. Id. at 735. 
150. Id. at 736. 
151. See, e.g., Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150, 154, 156 (1970) (holding that to fall within the scope of the APA, 
the alleged injury could fall “within the zone of interests to be protected 
or regulated” by the statutes the agencies allegedly violated); Barlow v. 
Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (same); Scalia, supra note 69, at 889 
(describing the holding in Data Processing as expanding the APA’s 
requirement of being “within the meaning of the relevant statute” to 
“adversely affected or aggrieved in a respect which the statute sought to 
prevent”). 
152. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734–35. 
153. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d 
Cir. 1970). The Second Circuit held first that claims under the APA 
were appropriate where the specific statutes made reference to 
“aggrieved parties,” but had either no judicial review process at all or no 
adequate process. Id. at 102. Further, because two statutes granted 
public interest rights in environmental resources, plaintiffs had standing 
as “aggrieved parties” within the meaning of the statute even though 
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must allege harm pursuant to some statute that would include him 
among “aggrieved” parties, or at least consider his claim as within the 
zone of interests of the statute.  
In contrast, the Court in SCRAP granted various environmental 
groups standing under the APA for a claim alleging that the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had unlawfully imposed a 
surcharge on freight rates without considering the environmental 
impact such a tariff would cause on the entire D.C. area.154 While it 
may seem that this claim’s standing is equally as tenuous as the one 
in Sierra Club, there are two distinguishing aspects between these 
cases. First, the Interstate Commerce Act contains language stating 
that upon receiving a complaint, or by its own volition, the ICC may 
conduct a hearing on the lawfulness of such rates.155 Thus, for the 
purposes of APA standing, the plaintiffs used this provision as a basis 
for their environmental claims, asserting they were “aggrieved” by the 
surcharge.156 Second, the Sierra Club plaintiffs could not claim that 
they would be directly harmed by the agency action; however, the 
groups in SCRAP alleged that the widespread environmental impact 
of the surcharge in the region would necessarily affect them.157 
Moreover, the allegedly adverse effects of federal action in Sierra Club 
would be limited in geographic scope to that particular refuge and to 
those who specifically used it. Here, on the other hand, there was 
potential for pervasive environmental injury by affecting the natural 
resources for the entire area.158  Thus, in order for a plaintiff to 
successfully use the APA as a vehicle for his claim, he must still allege 
a personalized injury and be “aggrieved” (or within the zone of 
interests) per a specific statute.  
 
they were not personally harmed. Id. at 105. See also Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 614 (1965). 
154. 412 U.S. 669, 670 (1973). 
155. Id. at 673 n.2 (quoting Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7)). 
While the case does not discuss this explicitly, it is worth noting that 
the Act also has a clause stating that the ICC may conduct a hearing 
for “parties aggrieved.” 49 U.S.C. §1(2); see also Henderson v. United 
States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (holding that an African-American 
passenger on a train who was denied seating met the conditions for 
“aggrieved party” under the Interstate Commerce Act and had standing 
to bring suit against the ICC). 
156. In line with previous decisions, the Court acknowledged that non-
economic injuries such as environmental or aesthetic concerns are also 
“deserving of the legal protection through the judicial process.” 412 U.S. 
at 686.  
157. Id. at 685.   
158. Id. at 687. 
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D. Prudential Limitations and Third-Party Standing 
The second aspect of standing that is considered in addition to 
the Article III requirements is that the plaintiff must overcome any 
judicially-imposed prudential factors, which are “presumptions 
derived from common-law tradition designed to determine whether a 
legal right exists.”159 The most commonly invoked prudential concern 
with administrative agencies is the general prohibition on third-party 
standing, where a third party asserts a claim on behalf of another 
injured party.160 This limitation is derived from two policy rationales. 
First, adjudicating third-party rights may be unnecessary,161 and it 
may even be the case that the injured parties do not want their rights 
asserted.162 Second, “third parties themselves usually will be the best 
proponents of their own rights.”163 Because courts depend on “effective 
advocacy,” they should “construe legal rights only when the most 
effective advocates of those rights are before them.”164 However, in 
some cases, third-party standing is allowed in light of “countervailing 
considerations.”165 There are two such overriding elements that the 
courts have considered when granting third-party standing. First, the 
interests of the third-party litigant and the injured party he 
 
159. Scalia, supra note 69, at 886. 
160. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (holding that a litigant can 
generally not raise another person’s legal rights); see also Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 500 (1975) (“[T]he plaintiff generally must 
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to 
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. . . . Without such 
limitations . . . essentially matters of judicial self-governance—the courts 
would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public 
significance even though other governmental institutions may be more 
competent to address the questions and even though judicial 
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”).  
161. Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1140 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(stating the prudential standing principle that federal courts should 
“refrain from resolving abstract questions of wide public significance”); 
see also FCC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (holding that where a 
large number of people are suffering together, “the political process, 
rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate 
remedy for a widely shared grievance”). 
162. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976); see also The Wilderness 
Soc’y v. Cane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011) (reiterating 
the Singleton holding).   
163. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114. 
164. Id. 
165. The Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1172; Warth, 422 U.S. at 500–01 
(stating that countervailing considerations “may outweigh the concerns 
underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power when the 
plaintiff’s claim to relief rests on the legal rights of third parties”).   
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represents must be “inextricably bound,” and the two must have a 
close relationship.166 For example, in Singleton v. Wulff, the Supreme 
Court granted standing to two physicians who brought an action on 
behalf of their patients challenging the constitutionality of a Missouri 
statute that excluded certain abortions from Medicaid benefits.167 
While recognizing the general ban on third-party standing, the Court 
considered the relationship between the doctor and patient and found 
that “[i]f the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the 
activity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at least can be sure 
that its construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense that 
the right’s enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the 
suit.”168 Because the physicians would receive payment for the 
excluded abortions if the statute were overturned, they would “enjoy” 
the right the patients would receive if the statute were deemed 
unconstitutional. Essentially, this exception maintains third-party 
standing because both the third-party and the injured party have an 
interest in the suit, ensuring that there is a proper “case” or 
“controversy” per Article III.169  
The second countervailing consideration is that even if there is a 
close relationship between the litigant and third party, “‘some genuine 
obstacle’ to the third party asserting his own rights must exist.”170 
This exception was expounded in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the 
Supreme Court held that a doctor had standing to assert claims on 
behalf of his third-party patients in challenging the constitutionality 
of a statute that prohibited medical professionals from giving advice 
to married couples that would prevent conception.171 In addition to 
finding that a close relationship existed between the doctor and 
patient, the Court also recognized that the rights of married couples 
at issue here were “likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless 
those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this 
kind of confidential relation to them.”172 Thus, if injured parties face 
 
166. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–15; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188–89 
(1973).   
167. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–15. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 113–14. 
170. The Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1172 (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 
116).  
171. 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). 
172. Id. at 481; Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114–15; see also Truax v. Raich, 239 
U.S. 33, 36 (1915) (holding an employee had standing to assert rights of 
his employer); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (holding that a 
white defendant, as a party to a racially-restrictive covenant, had 
standing to raise rights of African-American purchasers claiming a 
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obstacles that could be overcome through third-party litigation, then 
the representative parties are accorded standing.  
Eisenstadt v. Baird is a similar case illustrating the two 
countervailing considerations. The petitioner in that case was a 
distributor of contraceptives who challenged the constitutionality of a 
statute that denied unmarried persons access to contraceptives. He 
was granted standing on behalf of those whose rights were restrained 
under the statute, even though his rights were not personally 
restricted under it (i.e., he was able to obtain contraceptives himself), 
and he was not an authorized distributor under the statute. Even 
though he lacked the close personal relationship with the injured 
parties as in Griswold, the Supreme Court held that the relationship 
between the plaintiff and those whose rights he sought to assert was 
“not simply that between a distributor and potential distributees, but 
that between an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain 
contraceptives and those desirous of doing so.”173 Further, the injured 
parties in this case, unmarried couples, were not subject to 
prosecution because they could not obtain contraceptives in the first 
place (unlike the married couples in Griswold); thus, they were 
effectively denied a forum to defend their rights, in which case third-
party standing was more appropriate.174 In certain cases, then, third-
party standing can escape prudential limitations, and in fact even be 
encouraged. 
Even though there are exceptional circumstances when third-
party standing is allowed, where the legislature determines that a 
legal right exists through statutory language, the “prudential inquiry 
is displaced.”175 Moreover, as long as Congress has created a right of 
action, litigants can “seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and 
interest of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest 
in support of their claim.”176 Thus, an explicit private right of action 
would preempt any prudential concerns a court may raise in denying 
standing. Standing could then be granted, provided that Article III 
requirements were also met.177 
 
violation of equal protection, even though no African-Americans were 
party to the suit).   
173. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1972); see also Robert Allen 
Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme 
Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 631 (1962).  
174. 405 U.S. at 445–46; see also Barrows, 346 U.S. at 249. 
175. Scalia, supra note 69, at 886; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) 
(“Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who 
otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”). 
176. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 
177. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 71 (“[T]he Court may interpret statutes 
authorizing any citizen to sue to expand standing to the maximum 
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In addition, a private right of action can circumvent other 
prudential concerns, such as any political considerations that may 
arise. In Allen v. Wright, plaintiff-parents did not have standing to 
prevent the government from violating the law in granting tax 
exemptions to racially discriminatory schools.178 One of the reasons 
the Court decided against standing was that the parents’ injury was 
not “fairly traceable” to the allegedly wrongful conduct of the IRS.179 
This conclusion is supported by the idea that separation of powers 
“underlies standing doctrine.”180 If standing were granted in this case, 
then the federal courts would effectively be “monitors of the wisdom 
and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the 
Congress acting through its committees and the ‘power of the purse’; 
it is not the role of the judiciary.”181 Therefore, if Congress wants to 
carve out a role for the judiciary in such actions, it could do so by 
creating an express right of action in the relevant statutes. Such a 
solution would provide injured parties or third-party litigants the 
necessary means of litigation without triggering prudential, separation 
of powers, and other political concerns.  
IV. Victim Participation in the International Criminal 
Court 
The second major analog to a right of public participation comes 
from international law: the idea of public participation is not just 
rooted in public interest litigation in U.S. law; it also has a place in 
international law at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 
Rome Statute creating the ICC is unique in that it contains a victim 
participation clause to allow victims of crimes tried in the ICC to be 
able to participate in the proceedings.182 The clause creates a 
statutory right for victims to “be able to appear before the court and 
express their views in all stages of the proceedings.”183 It is important 
to note that while the extent of the ICC’s victim participation in 
 
allowed by Article III. In other words, Congress in expressly permitting 
such citizen suits is seen as abrogating prudential requirements and 
allowing standing so long as it is constitutionally permissible.”). 
178. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
179. Id. at 753. 
180. Id. at 759–60. 
181. Id. at 759–60 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). 
182. Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspects of Victim Participation in the 
Proceedings of the International Criminal Court, 90 INT’L REV. OF THE 
RED CROSS 409, 409 (2008).  
183. ICC, Victims and Witnesses, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/ 
Structure+of+the+Court/Victims/; Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
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judicial proceedings is novel, the concept of victim participation in 
criminal proceedings is not—a few other countries, such as Spain, 
provide victims with the right to participate in criminal proceedings 
as a prosecutor with full prosecutorial rights.184 Other jurisdictions 
accord similar rights where they allow victims to act as “subsidiary 
prosecutors” who can submit evidence; provide input on questions to 
be asked of the witnesses and defendant; and comment on statements 
and evidence submitted in the proceedings. In the U.S., Canada, 
Israel, New Zealand, Ireland, and parts of Australia, victims can 
partake in criminal proceedings by submitting victim impact 
statements or opinions.185 Thus, the ICC is the first to promulgate 
such extensive victim participation in international judicial 
proceedings; however, the basis for such a system—the belief that 
victims have a fundamental right of involvement in criminal 
proceedings that directly affect them—has long been recognized in 
several countries.186  
The international community recognized the important role that a 
victim could play in ICC proceedings, both within and outside the 
courtroom, as a “witness” or a “participant.” Victims are allowed to, 
among other things: (1) attend and participate in hearings before the 
Court; (2) make statements during the opening and closing 
statements; (3) provide observations to judges while the ICC is 
deciding whether to proceed with an investigation; (4) present their 
views to the judges when the ICC is deciding what charges to bring 
against the accused; and (5) ask questions to a witness, expert, or 
accused appearing in the Court.187 
In addition, they may also participate without appearing in court 
and may send information to the ICC Prosecutor to provide him with 
details or evidence of crimes the victim believes have been 
committed.188 In this way, the ICC allows victims of crimes against 
 
184. Carsten Stahn, et al., Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings 
of the ICC, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 219, 223 (2005). There has actually 
been a growing trend in the international community starting in the 
1960s to amend government policies to address victim compensation. 
See Mina Rauschenbach & Damien Scalia, Victims and International 
Criminal Justice: A Vexed Question?, 90 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 
441, 442 (2008). 
185. Stahn, supra note 184, at 223. 
186. See Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for 
Participation, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 294, 295–97 (describing schemes for 
victim participation in England and Ireland). 
187. ICC, VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GUIDE 
FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT 
13, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C029F900-C529-
46DB-9080-60D92B25F9D2/282477/160910VPRSBookletEnglish3.pdf.  
188. Id. at 9. 
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humanity to seek some form of legal redress and reparations that 
would not be available in their home countries. Further, allowing 
victims to report information about crimes is a valuable asset when 
gathering evidence and can assist the ICC by providing information 
that the Prosecutor might otherwise not be able to obtain.  
Victims are also always entitled to a legal representative who can 
present their interests to the ICC. The Victims and Witness Unit 
even assists in finding legal counsel and helps with arranging the 
representation.189 Thus, the victim participation scheme is devised so 
that victims have both a forum and representation to make their 
claims.  
The policy rationales for the ICC Statute’s victim participation 
clause are manifold. First, the inclusion of such a clause has an 
important symbolic value—the extensive recognition that victims 
must have access to justice and a right to be made whole, especially 
because many do not have such avenues within their own countries.190 
A U.N. General Assembly Resolution, The Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 
reiterates the importance of this access to justice, demonstrating that 
victims’ rights speak to a value that must be upheld in the 
international community.191 Second, the incorporation of victims’ 
perspectives serves an equitable function as well; it helps to keep the 
proceedings balanced. Victims’ interests often diverge from those of 
the Prosecutor or the states involved, and consideration for victims 
ensures that the process remains fair and objective.192 Further, the 
recognition of victims’ rights has two additional far-reaching effects. 
The first is a practical one: by including and factoring in first-hand 
accounts and knowledge of the commission of the relevant crimes, 
thus the victims provide evidentiary value. Victims are in the best 
position to describe actual events, and this knowledge may be crucial 
to the Prosecutor when deciding whether to initiate an investigation. 
 
189. Id. at 10.  
190. See WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF 
LAW, VICTIM PARTICIPATION BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 8–9 (2007) (explaining how traditional norms of retributive 
justice are shifting to incorporate elements of restorative justice); Emily 
Haslam, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A 
Triumph of Hope over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 315 (Dominic McGoldrick 
et al. eds., 2004). 
191. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶¶ 1(b), 11(a), 12–14, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005); see also Stahn, supra note 184, at 226. 
192. Stahn, supra note 184, at 227; but see Baumgartner, supra note 182, at 
415–16 (questioning whether the potential advantages of trying to 
counter-balance the Prosecutor can actually be met). 
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The second is that victims’ suffering is made known to the 
international community, which has a significant moral and symbolic 
effect by providing reconciliation to the aggrieved persons and 
nations.193  
Even though the victim participation clause speaks to ideals and 
values the international community is trying to preserve, there are 
several logistical and practical problems with the implementation of 
this idea. A broad and sweeping interpretation of victims’ rights could 
interfere with two bedrock principles of the ICC: the basic functioning 
of the Court as a judicial institution, and the necessity of 
impartiality.194 The ICC (or any court, for that matter) is designed 
primarily as a judicial institution; it is not equipped to serve as a 
public forum or claims commission for thousands of victims, each with 
their own accounts and situations. By allowing the potential influx of 
victims’ into ICC proceedings, the clause imposes heavy 
administrative burdens on the inner workings of the Court, and 
effectively delays or halts the Court’s proceedings.195 Moreover, court 
proceedings are predicated on fairness and expediency, which are 
basic elements of due process. Victim participation can cause delays, 
which may prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial.196 Even 
more problematic is that the inclusion of victims in the early stages of 
the proceeding contradicts the presumption of innocence—the Court 
may begin to consider (and lean toward) the victims’ position without 
the input from the defense.197 Additionally, there is a concern that 
 
193. Stahn, supra note 184, at 227; see also U.N. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL 
AND CRIME PREVENTION, HANDBOOK ON JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS ON THE 
USE AND APPLICATION OF THE DECLARATION OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF 
JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME AND ABUSE OF POWER 39 (1999). 
194. See Baumgartner, supra note 182, at 415. 
195. Stahn, supra note 184, at 229; see also Christine H. Chung, Victims’ 
Participation at the International Criminal Court: Are Concessions of 
the Court Clouding the Promise?, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS 459, 
489 (2008).   
196. See Chung, supra note 195, at 489–91 (arguing that undue delay was 
precisely the defense’s concern in the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a 
DRC militia leader). 
197. See Claude Jorda & Jérôme de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the 
Victim, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1399 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) 
(warning that there is already a delicate balance between the roles of a 
prosecutor and defendant, and that the interjection of a third player as 
the victim may disrupt this balance, causing prejudice to the 
defendant); Stahn, supra note 184, at 227; Chung, supra note 195, at 
490. 
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despite the Rome Statute’s best intentions, there has been little 
“meaningful” victim participation in practice.198    
Notwithstanding these concerns and criticisms, the victim 
participation clause remains part of the Rome Statute, signifying its 
importance to the international community. There may be logistical 
and administrative problems, but the basic notion of victim 
participation is still upheld.199  
V. The Alien Tort Statute 
Perhaps the earliest attempt in U.S. history to recognize the 
rights of foreigners in U.S. courts is shown through the Alien Tort 
Clause, the predecessor to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The Alien 
Tort Clause was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and it allowed 
district courts to have jurisdiction over cases where an alien sued only 
for a violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty.200 The Clause 
was included to ensure that tort claims based on violations of the law 
of nations were “cognizable” in federal courts.201 The root of the ATS’ 
power lies in the Diversity Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which 
provides the extension of judicial power to cases and controversies 
between a “State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens 
or subjects.”202 Through this clause, the ATS allows a foreign plaintiff 
to sue American citizens.203 The primary rationale at the time was 
national security—Alexander Hamilton expressed in the Federalist 
Papers that the denial of justice abroad was a real concern for the 
U.S. federal judiciary because violations of rights abroad could lead to 
retaliation against the U.S.204 By providing for an impartial process 
through the federal judiciary, the ATS could serve as a judicial 
 
198. See Chung, supra note 195, at 509–14 (citing examples of how only a 
handful of hundreds of victims’ applications to participate were 
accepted, among other issues). 
199. See Baumgartner, supra note 182, at 440 (arguing that the ICC needs 
reform and stricter, more defined guidelines, but victim compensation 
and participation is still a worthy cause); Rauschenbach & Scalia, supra 
note 184, at 459 (same); Chung, supra note 195, at 525–36 (proposing 
several solutions to improve the victim participation scheme, rather 
than dispense with it altogether). 
200. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 587, 587 (2002).  
201. Anthony D’Amato, The Alien Tort Statue and the Founding of the 
Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 64–65 (1988).  
202. U.S. CONST. art. III.  
203. D’Amato, supra note 201, at 65. 
204. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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solution to a potential political problem.205 While these same security 
concerns may not exist presently, the U.S. still has an interest in 
upholding foreigners’ rights because the U.S. must preserve the 
perception that it will deal fairly and impartially with cases having 
global implications.206 The origins of the ATS are significant because 
it shows that since its inception, the U.S. has had a policy of 
recognizing the rights of foreigners, and that such rights are 
fundamental in that they stem from the Constitution. The ATS 
evidences at least some U.S. commitment to rights of foreign citizens. 
The existence of the ATS has mostly had symbolic value as very 
few cases were brought under this Act—in fact, the statute “lay 
dormant”207 for nearly 200 years until the landmark Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala case was heard in the Second Circuit in 1980.208 That Court held 
for an expansive reading of the ATS, which provided federal 
jurisdiction over torts in violation of the law of nations, even if those 
torts were not recognized in 1789.209 Specifically, the Court held that 
torture was a tort recognized under the Act because it violates the 
law of nations.210 Because the statute’s language only calls for a 
“violation” of the law of nations to be actionable, any current 
violation of international law would suffice to create a cause of action 
in federal court.211 The Court further held that the ATS was intended 
to be dynamic so that it could provide a federal remedy for all torts in 
violation of the law of nations.212  
However, this extensive interpretation of the ATS was 
controversial at the time, and has continued to cause conflict among 
scholars regarding the ATS’ proper interpretation.213 In a decision 
 
205. D’Amato, supra note 201, at 65–66 (describing Hamilton’s concern that 
state courts were biased against aliens, and only a federal court could 
impartially adjudicate cases involving foreigners). 
206. Id. at 67.  
207. Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What 
Piracy Reveals about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 111, 112 (2005). 
208. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
209. Id. at 881. 
210. Id. at 882. 
211. William S. Dodge, Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Response to the “Originalists”, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 
222 (1995).  
212. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887–88; see also Note, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: A 
New Forum for Violations of International Human Rights, 30 AM. U. L. 
REV. 807, 821–22 (1981). 
213. See Farooq Hassan, Note, A Conflict of Philosophies: The Filártiga 
Jurisprudence, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 250, 257 (1983) (cautioning, for 
example, that usage of the ATS may prompt more hostile nations to 
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following and applying Filártiga, Judge Robert Bork wrote in a 
concurring opinion that the Filártiga court construed the ATS too 
broadly, which ultimately led to a contrasting school of thought for 
“originalists.” He believed that many modern human rights cases 
could not be brought in federal courts and were not justiciable 
because the law of nations does not provide an express cause of 
action, which is generally required in order for claims to be heard in 
U.S. courts.214 Further, Judge Bork argued that only the original torts 
(offenses against ambassadors, safe passage, and piracy),215 which 
reflected the law of nations in 1789, provided the requisite cause of 
action.216 Thus, because modern torts in violation of the law of nations 
do not grant an express cause of action, federal courts cannot have 
jurisdiction under the ATS for these claims. The details and nuances 
of the differences in the positions between the originalists and those 
that side with the Filártiga majority are beyond the scope of this 
Note; however, what is significant is the interpretative spread between 
the two sides. The ATS has remained limited in application, and 
where it has been applied, courts and scholars are in wide 
disagreement.217 
In addition to the disagreement over the latitude of the ATS, 
there are other restrictions with the ATS’ application. Generally, the 
legal suits have fallen into one of two categories. First, there are 
claims by foreigners against foreigners, which has been a controversial 
use of the ATS. For these types of cases, courts suggest that only 
crimes that “bear resemblance to eighteenth century paradigms” like 
piracy should be allowed in federal courts.218 The second type of case 
is when foreign citizens have sued foreign and American corporations 
 
assert similar jurisdiction over international law claims against foreign 
visitors, leading to “chaotic or unjust results”); Jeffrey M. Blum & 
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human 
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 
22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 88–89 (1981) (devising a three-part test to 
determine which rights should be actionable under the ATS, thereby 
limiting the application of the ATS). 
214. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798–823 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Bork, J., concurring).  
215. Kontorovich, supra note 207, at 113. 
216. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798–823. 
217. It is worth noting that Congress did pass the Torture Victim Protection 
Act in 1992, following Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in Tel-Oren. 
Congress specifically included an express cause of action making torture 
an actionable crime in U.S. federal courts. Due to the egregious and 
universal nature of torture, Congress wanted to unambiguously carve 
out an actionable right for certain crimes. See Dodge, supra note 211, at 
238. 
218. See Kontorovich, supra note 207, at 113. 
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for violating international human rights and environmental standards 
in their business practices abroad, or for facilitating such violations of 
foreign governments.219 Choosing defendants like corporations may 
have been a strategic choice, as plaintiffs would be more likely to 
recover damages while also avoiding sovereign immunity challenges, 
but Filártiga’s scope could have allowed for more cases of foreigners 
against corrupt governments.220 
In the most recent application of the ATS, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain221 that the ATS is a 
jurisdictional statute, where the only exceptions are the original 
Blackstone common law offenses.222 Essentially, the ATS only provides 
jurisdiction over those historical paradigms envisioned by the First 
Congress. Unlike the Filártiga court, the Supreme Court held that it 
is not sufficient for the modern tort to be recognized by modern 
customary international law; “rather, it must violate customary 
international law in a way that connects it to the concerns manifest in 
the eighteenth century offense describe by Blackstone and 
contemplated by Congress.”223 The Court established a two-prong test 
to determine whether a modern international norm comes within the 
scope of the ATS: (1) the international norm must be near universal 
in its acceptance, and (2) the conduct it prohibits must be defined 
with considerable specificity.224 Thus, despite the ATS’ and Congress’ 
best intentions, its application remains limited and controversial. 
Several types of cases, such as those by foreigners against U.S. 
agencies, or those involving modern torts, have not—and perhaps 
cannot—be raised under the ATS. For these foreign plaintiffs, there is 
still no method of recourse in U.S. federal courts.  
The examination of the ATS is crucial in that it shows the statute 
is limited in scope, controversial, and ill-equipped to deal with the 
unique challenges that USAID funding raises to the issue of human 
rights violations. Thus, the confined nature of the ATS supports the 
fact that there is no current mechanism in place to deal with the 
types of complaints and grievances felt by victims of misappropriated 
USAID funds. Further, Judge Bork’s assertion that an express cause 
of action is needed to bring modern violations of international law to 
 
219. Id. at 117. 
220. Id. (“Given the widespread use of torture, murder, and political 
repression by the governments of the world, the ATS cases represented 
but a small fraction of what could have been brought under Filártiga’s 
broad construction of the statute.”). 
221. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
222. Id. at 694. 
223. Kontorovich, supra note 207, at 121; 542 U.S. at 716. 
224. Kontorovich, supra note 207, at 121; 542 U.S. at 725. 
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U.S. courts—confirmed through Congress’ subsequent passage of the 
Torture Victim Protection Act225—shows that to avoid ambiguity, an 
express cause of action is required and needed to ensure certain 
violations are actionable in U.S. federal courts.  
VI. The Federal Tort Claims Act 
At first glance, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)226 seems like 
another possible route for private parties to bring a suit against the 
U.S. in federal district court. The types of actions included under the 
FTCA are for damage to property, personal injury, or death caused 
by wrongful acts or omissions of government employees, or those 
acting on behalf of the U.S., while acting within the scope of their 
office or employment.227 The FTCA provides a limited exception to 
sovereign immunity, which generally forecloses a suit from being 
brought against a country’s government without its consent.228 Given 
its narrow scope, the FTCA does not cover agency actions—it only 
addresses actions taken by specific individuals acting within the 
course of their employment with the government.229 Thus, the FTCA 
is also unavailable as a method of recourse for foreign victims. 
VII. Application of Public and Victim Participation 
Doctrine to USAID 
A. Absence of Redress for Victims of Misappropriated USAID Funding  
By examining the various types of statutes and cases that have 
somehow involved public victim participation in court or government 
proceedings, the primary concern is clear: there are no current means 
of legal recourse or redress for victims of misappropriated USAID 
funds. However, while this established body of law highlights the 
problems and inadequacies of the U.S. system in dealing with these 
types of victims, they also illuminate the path to a solution. First, 
they show that the notion of public participation is deeply rooted in 
U.S. history, and is also practiced internationally. Second, while they 
all support the idea of victim participation, none of the current cases 
or statutes would support a claim made by a victim of misused 
USAID funds. USAID has no internal mechanism for grievances or 
 
225. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
226. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2011).  
227. Kevin E. Lunday, Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1254, 1255 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).   
228. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 365 (4th ed. 2011); see also Thomas A. 
Varlan, Defining the Government’s Duty under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, 33 VAND. L. REV. 795, 800 (1980). 
229. Varlan, supra note 228, at 796. 
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judicial review, and the types of human rights violations do not fit 
into the usual paradigm of tort cases that have been filed in U.S. 
federal courts per the ATS or FTCA.230 For example, while U.S. aid 
money has helped to fund these violations, the crimes themselves were 
committed by governments or individuals within the foreign 
countries;231 therefore, a traditional criminal liability or negligence 
analysis would not necessarily implicate USAID or deter such 
violations in the future. Further, as USAID is a large agency with 
multiple actors, donors, and political considerations, it would be 
difficult to prove the necessary elements of a typical tort violation, 
including the responsible party and causation. Thus, an alternative 
solution is needed to fill this void.  
The APA has so far not been used as a cause of action to 
challenge USAID agency action. As previously discussed, the APA 
provides a cause of action where an agency’s governing statute either 
uses terms such as “aggrieved” or “adversely affected,” or at least 
seeks to protect certain rights.232 In the latter case, the statute has to 
aim to prevent a particular harm—if a claim arises that that harm 
has occurred, the APA may provide a cause of action in that case 
because it falls with the “zone of interests” of the statute.233 The 
FAA, however, does not contain such language—there is no explicit 
reference to “aggrieved” or anything similar,234 and it does not 
actively seek to prevent any specific harm or injury.235 Some may 
argue that using the APA is a better method of challenging USAID 
agency action, as it is a pre-existing mechanism and would require 
 
230. See supra notes 200–29 and accompanying text. 
231. ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 40–41; VIETNAM REPORT, supra note 
4, at 26, 30–40. 
232. See supra notes 139–58 and accompanying text. 
233. See id. 
234. If a term like “adverse” is used, it is in reference to specific projects, not 
people affected by them. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. 
L. No. 87-195, § 232(b), 75 Stat. 424 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 
(1961)) (referring to adverse environmental impacts); id. § 237 
(regarding insurance and financing programs, and possible adverse 
effects on investment). 
235. The FAA does have a section addressing human rights, stating that no 
funds should be allocated to governments with a history of documented 
human rights violations. In determining whether this standard is being 
met, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations may require proof from 
the USAID Administrator and terminate assistance if necessary. See id. 
§ 116. However, while this safeguard is in place, it does not appear that 
the FAA actively seeks to protect the rights of victims; it is more that 
USAID does not wish to aid in the violation of their rights. Thus, the 
appropriate statutory language does not exist for a claim to be brought 
via the APA. 
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fewer changes to the FAA. Several other agencies’ statutes already 
contain references to an “aggrieved party” or something similar,236 and 
thus an amendment to the FAA along these lines could model its 
language based on these. Nonetheless, this Note argues for a more 
extensive amendment to the FAA through an express private right of 
action, as this solution avoids ambiguity, addresses prudential 
concerns, and has a better chance of actually vindicating the interest 
of victims. The large corpus of public rights cases in U.S. federal 
courts, as well as the existence of other types of victim participation 
statutes, can also serve as a guide for statutory amendments to the 
FAA. 
B. Regulatory Agencies as a Model for USAID 
While the case law focused on regulatory agencies, not agencies 
like USAID, they indicated a progression of liberalized standing 
requirements, ultimately allowing claims against federal agencies from 
more parties and for new types of injuries. Congress should now 
reform non-regulatory agencies like USAID in a similar manner as a 
continuation of this expansive trend. The impetus for this growth was 
to help federal agencies realize their statutory purpose to serve the 
public; thus, by incorporating more claims, the courts aid in 
vindicating that public interest. Because of USAID’s unique function, 
it aims to serve a “public” that resides beyond U.S. borders.237 Indeed, 
USAID’s stated goal, as reiterated in many provisions of the FAA, is 
to assist developing countries achieve sustainable development, 
through, inter alia, monitoring, reporting, and commitments against 
corruption and human rights violations.238 Thus the notion of “public 
interest” should expand to those adversely affected by USAID actions, 
even though they do not live in the U.S.; with that expansion, the 
federal courts should assume a role to vindicate their interests as 
well.239  
 
236. Compare Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825/(b), and Federal 
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6), with Federal Aviation Act, 
49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (allowing “any person disclosing a substantial 
interest in such order” to obtain review), Interstate Commerce Act, 49 
U.S.C. §1(2) (providing for the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
investigate claims from “parties aggrieved”), National Labor Relations 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (preventing labor disputes that would “adversely 
affect” the rights of the public; Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
80(a)-42(a) (claiming to eliminate conditions that “adversely affect” the 
national public interest”); see also Note, supra note 101, at 430; Albert, 
supra note 88, at 429 n.12. 
237. See Foreign Assistance Act § 101. 
238. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
239. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy 
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“We must assess claims 
that one of the agencies charged with its administration has failed to 
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The cases discussed in Part III serve several functions and are 
instructional for amending the FAA and USAID. The case law reveals 
that an express right of action accomplishes four things: it (1) 
overrides prudential concerns of third-party standing,240 (2) avoids any 
political questions that may otherwise arise,241 (3) silences issues of 
governmental immunity, and (4) eases the granting of standing.242 In 
order to provide victims of USAID funding with a legal remedy, the 
FAA should thus contain an express private right of action allowing 
these victims to challenge USAID agency action. As previously 
mentioned, this right must specify the persons able to bring suit; 
those who are potentially liable; forum for a suit; and possible 
remedies available.243  
The persons able to bring suit should be those who have been 
directly harmed by misappropriated USAID funds, as well as third-
party groups who have an interest in the litigation and are in a better 
position to bring suit on behalf of actual victims. The primary 
concern is that while a cause of action nominally creates an avenue 
for victims, it is unlikely that victims of USAID funding in 
inaccessible rural areas of a developing country will have access to the 
U.S. judicial system. Therefore, the FAA amendment should allow 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or other groups or 
corporations to raise a claim on behalf of the victims. United Church 
provides the most useful precedent and guidance in this matter.244 In 
that case, the plaintiffs were groups deemed as representatives of the 
public interest.245 Similarly, human rights groups or other types of 
NGOs, through their very mission and function, serve to represent the 
rights and interests of those citizens in countries where human rights 
violations are occurring.246 The United Church court also applied a 
 
live up to the congressional mandate. Our duty, in short, is to see that 
important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not 
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”). 
240. See supra notes 159–77 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text. 
243. Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. CV 09-08950, 2010 WL 1444878, at 
*7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010), aff’d 722 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
244. See Note, supra note 101, at 425, 433 (maintaining that the public right 
of intervention adopted in United Church will likely be extended to 
other agencies).  
245. Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 
1001 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
246. See, e.g., Mission Statement, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
http://www.hrw.org/about (asserting that they are “dedicated to 
protecting human rights of people around the world” and committed to 
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broader view of “genuine and legitimate interest” for the purposes of 
standing, which should also cover such NGOs—as part of their 
mission to raise awareness and prevent human rights abuses, they 
have a genuine and legitimate interest in litigating such claims.  
Further, United Church recognized that such groups representing 
the public interest helped the FCC perform its statutory obligations 
by informing them of the public’s concerns. Human rights NGOs can 
play a similar role—by raising claims of abuses, they not only 
vindicate the victims’ interests, but they simultaneously inform 
USAID of the problems occurring in the various countries. With 
USAID’s structural problems and reduced staffing, it is not aware of 
the conditions in the countries once the funding is disbursed. NGOs 
can serve as a fact-finder and can apprise USAID of these problems, 
helping both victims and USAID in fulfilling its purpose. HRW, which 
conducted the two inquiries in Ethiopia and Vietnam, acknowledged 
the relative inaccessibility of the areas where the violations were 
occurring. In fact, it was difficult even for them to talk to people 
affected by the funding or find those who were willing to share their 
concerns.247 If an independent organization has difficulty gaining 
access, then it is unreasonable to expect a large agency like USAID to 
access or be aware of the conditions in each of the targeted developing 
areas. Regardless, an NGO like HRW has a better chance of 
discovering the true conditions in developing nations and of serving as 
a fact-finding organization that can report on the implementation and 
effects of USAID funds on the actual citizens of aid countries.248 In 
these cases, NGOs would be akin to Commissions of Inquiry that have 
been used in the U.N. as fact-finding tools.249 Using NGOs and their 
 
investigating and exposing human rights violations and holding abusers 
accountable).  
247. VIETNAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 26, 30–40; ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 44–45. 
248. With regard to prudential standing concerns, it is possible that NGOs 
would be granted standing on behalf of such victims even without a 
private right of action. In line with Griswold and Eisenstadt, this 
situation contains countervailing considerations. NGOs like HRW have 
a relationship with victims tantamount to doctors and patients because 
victims share confidential information with them. See ETHIOPIA 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 6, 43. Further, given the obstacles these 
victims would face accessing U.S. courts, third-party standing seems 
both appropriate and preferred. In any case, a private right of action is 
still the most direct way to ensure access and standing. 
249. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Commissions of Inquiry into Armed Conflict, 
Breaches of the Laws of War, and Human Rights Abuses: Process, 
Standards, and Lessons Learned, 105 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL 
MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 81, 82 (2011).  
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accounts from victims is also supported by the policy rationales 
behind the victim participation clause in the ICC.250  
Because of this difficulty in accessibility, it is unlikely that 
USAID would be overburdened by complaints—HRW itself had 
trouble gaining access and information about victims,251 so it is even 
more unlikely that victims themselves will be inundating courts with 
claims. In any case, USAID could follow the FCC’s approach, and 
implement internal policy guidelines through which it can impose 
conditions and retain some level of control over which parties can 
raise claims.252  
Potentially liable parties should include those who could most 
effectively implement change, such as the USAID Administrator and 
the regional mission director overseeing a particular country or area 
(though they would not personally have to pay damages). The forum 
would be federal district court; as the FAA is a federal statute, a 
private right of action therein would give these courts original 
jurisdiction. Lastly, the remedies should include the possibility of 
monetary compensation provided by USAID for damages incurred to 
victims, as well as an order for increased monitoring by mission 
directors. While wholesale rescission of funding may be ultimately 
desirable, the political implications of such an action could jeopardize 
the U.S.’ diplomatic, military, or economic efforts in the country at 
issue. In any case, it is likely beyond the unilateral power of Congress 
or the courts to interfere with foreign policy on that level without 
participation of the President and the Executive Office.253 
C. Future Concerns and Long-Term Changes 
Even if the FAA is amended to create a right of action for 
victims, it will face several challenges in implementation—in addition 
to actually getting NGOs or victims access to federal courts, there are 
a number of other jurisdictional, venue, remedy and damages issues 
that require further exploration. 
As discussed previously, creating a cause of action is a short-term 
solution to bring current human rights violations to light, and to 
provide some recourse for foreign victims who are adversely affected 
by USAID funds. However, the true reform must occur within 
USAID’s organization and structure itself. While a statutory right of 
action deals with the problem, structural reform will prevent the 
 
250. See supra notes 190–93 and accompanying text. 
251. ETHIOPIA REPORT, supra note 3, at 6, 43. 
252. See supra notes 138–38 and accompanying text. 
253. The U.S. President has authority in several matters of foreign affairs. 
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing, among other things, that the 
President can enter into treaties with the advice and consent of the 
Senate and appoint ambassadors). 
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problem from occurring in the first place. Once USAID autonomy is 
restored, its agenda and budget will be controlled primarily by those 
devoted to providing aid to developing nations. This in turn will 
require that development be mainstreamed along with security and 
diplomacy as part of U.S. foreign policy. If development is recognized 
as a key component to U.S. foreign policy, USAID will be able to 
achieve more of its goals and provide the necessary staffing and 
attention to its projects abroad. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The U.S. has long played a role in the growth and development of 
developing nations through millions of dollars of funding for various 
projects. While the U.S. is still a leader in the development cause, a 
number of internal structural problems has led to mismanagement of 
the USAID funds in their target countries. These misappropriated 
funds have been used by foreign governments to withhold basic 
freedoms from their citizens, as well as violate their fundamental 
human rights. The ultimate solution lies in preventative measures, 
where USAID works to fix its internal problems through a complete 
overhaul of its mandate in the FAA—a solution that will likely take 
several years, due especially to the current state of the U.S. economy 
and its budget restraints.  
In order to immediately address the needs of victims, a limited 
amendment to the FAA is a more adequate solution. Such an 
amendment would create an express cause of action where victims 
could challenge USAID agency actions—namely, the funding provided 
for certain projects being used to commit human rights violations. 
This type of amendment would provide some remedies for the victims 
where they are unable to receive any in their home countries. Further, 
it would serve as a mechanism to report the actual conditions in these 
developing countries. Part of the problem is that USAID (with its 
reduced field presence) remains unaware of conditions after funding is 
distributed. With the help of NGOs and statutory recourse, victims 
would be able to achieve some relief, as well as serve as fact-finders to 
ultimately help USAID address the many human rights violations 
that are taking place.  
